




Risk-based Cyber Mission Assurance Process (RCMAP)

Overview

François Rhéaume

DRDC | RDDC





Presentation Outline

- Why a process?
 - Goals
 - RCMAP - Overview
 - Conclusion
-
- Annex - Example-driven overview: Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

Why a process?

- Canada's Defence Policy – 87th initiative:
Protect critical military networks and equipment from cyber attack by establishing a new Cyber Mission Assurance Program that will incorporate cyber security requirements into the procurement process.
- Cyber Mission Assurance Working Group (CMA WG) – Development of the Department of National Defence (DND) /Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Program
- System Security Engineering Working Group (SSE WG) – Platform Protection Program / Materiel Acquisition and Support life cycle



RCMAP goals

Support DND/CAF in developing instructions:

- That align cybersecurity on missions/operations objectives
- That align with and integrate into existing DND/CAF policies, directives and procedures
- That state what to do and how, from the management layer to the technical layer
- Tailored to the military domain / Canadian Armed Forces
- That align with the procurement process (PAD/MA&S)
- End goal: Increase the probability of mission success

Frameworks, guidelines, specifications



Process





Instructions, Directives, Orders




Information Technology
ITSG-33, NIST RMF

System Security Engineering
NIST SP 800-160




Aviation/Airworthiness
RTCA/DO-326A



MA&S life cycle
DND/CAF Missions

Risk-based
Cyber Mission Assurance
Process
DRDC RCMAP


DND/CAF Assets
Requirements
Methods



Platform Protection Program



ITS



Mission Security Engineering



Risk-based Cyber Mission Assurance




- ✓ Departmental and system-level security activities
- ✓ Business/Mission needs for security
- ✓ High-level security controls

- ✓ DND/SEDP/MA&S
- ✓ CAF Missions

Process for the procurement and/or development of cyber mission-assured systems


- ✓ Security Profiling




- ✓ SSE alignment
- ✓ Guidance on threat and risk assessment
- ✓ Guidance on the determination and verification of security measures

RCMAP - Overview

RCMAP – Principles




RCMAP – Principles




RCMAP – What to do


- 1 Describe the mission
- 2 Describe the functions that use electronic assets
- 3 List the potential threats to the mission
- 4 Determine the impacts on the mission
- 5 Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function
- 6 Define potential cyber threat scenarios on the assets and their impacts on functions
- 7 Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level




RCMAP – Activities




RCMAP – Mission Assurance Requirements Analysis Activities



RCMAP – Risk Assessment



Mission Assurance Requirements Analysis



DND/CAF
Assets

System
Architecture

Implemented
System

Risk Assessment

Attack Surface

Threat
Intelligence

Preliminary Risk
Assessment



Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures (TTPs)

CAPEC




Full Risk
Assessment




Threat scenarios

Risks



Risks


RCMAP – Security Development




RCMAP - Security Development

Management of requirements

System Security Requirements (SSRs)



Mission Assurance Security Requirements




Inherited/Existing Security Requirements


Contract award

Material Acquisition and Support life cycle


System Security Engineering



NIST Cybersecurity framework (CSF)



RCMAP - Progress





Conclusion

- RCMAP as of today:
 - First report on Mission Assurance Security Requirements is available
 - Second report on Risk Assessment and Security Development is under production
 - Third report will summarized each activities and subactivities (series of instructions)
 - Practical support tools:
 - Excel spreadsheets / Mission Assurance Security Requirements
 - Web tool (CSNI and stand-alone level II) / RCMAP as a whole (under construction)

Conclusion

- Ongoing activities:
 - RCMAP applied to the security assessment of military platforms:
 - CF188/JMPS
 - TAPV
 - RCMAP project is extended until 2021 to support transition to DND/CAF/Industry in all 3 environments
 - Support the SSE WG and CMA WG
 - Reshape RCMAP to Operational needs
 - Cyber Key Terrain Analysis
 - Shorter cycles
 - Increased support for quick risk assessment and options analysis



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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGIE ET SAVOIR
POUR LA DÉFENSE ET LA SÉCURITÉ DU CANADA





RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Procurement of an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)


Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

1

Describe the mission



Class	ID	Name
CAF Operation	<i>op₁</i>	DRIFTNET
	<i>op₂</i>	LIMPID
	<i>op₃</i>	NANOOK
	<i>op₄</i>	NUNALIVUT
	<i>op₅</i>	Search and Rescue
CAF Capability	<i>cap₁</i>	Conduct Maritime surface surveillance
	<i>cap₂</i>	Support Maritime Interdiction Operations
	<i>cap₃</i>	Sense acoustic signatures
	<i>cap₄</i>	Conduct Ground surveillance
	<i>cap₅</i>	Ensure Physical Protection and Survivability of Facilities including airports, seaports and similar bases of operation
	<i>cap₆</i>	Provide Indicators and Warnings
	<i>cap₇</i>	Produce Estimative Intelligence
	<i>cap₈</i>	Prevent Fratricide (Blue on Blue Engagements)



Canadian Forces Joint Publication



CFJP 01
Canadian Military Doctrine





Issued on authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff


RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)


























Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system
















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







Describe the mission

Critical	
Essential	
Routine	
Not allocated	



Class	ID	Name		<i>op₁</i>	<i>op₂</i>	<i>op₃</i>	<i>op₄</i>	<i>op₅</i>
CAF Operation	<i>op₁</i>	DRIFTNET	<i>cap₁</i>					
	<i>op₂</i>	LIMPID	<i>cap₂</i>					
	<i>op₃</i>	NANOOK	<i>cap₃</i>					
	<i>op₄</i>	NUNALIVUT	<i>cap₄</i>					
	<i>op₅</i>	Search and Rescue	<i>cap₅</i>					

<i>cap₁</i>	Conduct Maritime surface surveillance	<i>cap₆</i>					
<i>cap₂</i>	Support Maritime Interdiction Operations	<i>cap₇</i>					
<i>cap₃</i>	Sense acoustic signatures	<i>cap₈</i>					
<i>cap₄</i>	Conduct Ground surveillance						
<i>cap₅</i>	Ensure Physical Protection and Survivability of Facilities including airports and similar bases of operation						
<i>cap₆</i>	Provide Indicators and Warnings						
<i>cap₇</i>	Produce Estimative Intelligence						
<i>cap₈</i>	Prevent Fratricide (Blue on Blue Engagements)						


	Mission Dependency
<i>cap₁</i>	
<i>cap₂</i>	
<i>cap₃</i>	
<i>cap₄</i>	
<i>cap₅</i>	
<i>cap₆</i>	
<i>cap₇</i>	
<i>cap₈</i>	

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

2

Describe the functions that use electronic assets



System Type	Function
Aircraft mission and weapon planning	Prepare aircraft data (routes, targets of interests, weapons and characteristics)
Electronic flight control	Move the aircraft actuators
Surveillance radar	Object search and detection
Fire control system	Coordinate sensors and weapons
Identification Friend or Foe	Receive/Transmit IFF codes
Electronic Support Measures	Interception and analysis of radar emissions; Interception of communications (voice or datalink).
Combat management system	Provide a common tactical picture and threat evaluation
Engine diagnostic system	Engine state and fault codes retrieval and analysis
Braking system	Control and actuate brakes
Lighting system	Control and actuate lighting
Tactical radio	Receive/Transmit orders and military intelligence
GPS receiver	Positioning service
Domain Name Server	Address lookup service
Email server	Receive, store and disseminate emails of unclassified type



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

3

List the potential threats to the mission



System Function	Loss of Confidentiality
Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions	Enemy is warned about radar emissions interception and their classifications. In other words, the enemy is warned that we are aware of something about its radar emissions or someone else' radar emissions.
Interception of communications (voice or datalink).	Enemy is warned about communication interception (voice or datalink). In other words, the enemy knows that we are aware of something about its communications or someone else' communications.



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

3

List the potential threats to the mission



System Function	Loss of Integrity
Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. False positives are produced, i.e., radar emissions are reported that do not exist. 2. False negatives are produced, i.e., radar emissions that exist and that are detected are not reported by the ESM. 3. Radar emissions are classified in a wrong type.
Interception of communications (voice or datalink).	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. False positives are produced, i.e., Interceptions of communications are reported that do not exist or that are faked. 2. False negatives are produced, i.e., Communications that exist and that are intercepted are not reported by the ESM.



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

3

List the potential threats to the mission



System Function

Loss of Availability

Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions

No radar emission information is produced or disseminated to the operators. Operators are unaware of neither the presence nor the type of radar emissions.

Interception of communications (voice or datalink).

No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators. Operators are unaware of neither the presence nor the nature of the enemy's voice or datalink communications.

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

3

List the potential threats to the mission



System Function	MT ID	Mission Threat	Loss type
Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions	<i>mt₁</i>	Enemy is warned about radar emissions interception and their classifications. In other words, the enemy is warned that we are aware of something about its radar emissions or someone else' radar emissions.	C
	<i>mt₂</i>	False positives are produced, i.e., radar emissions are reported that do not exist.	I
	<i>mt₃</i>	False negatives are produced, i.e., radar emissions that exist and that are detected are not reported by the ESM.	I
	<i>mt₄</i>	Radar emissions are classified in a wrong type.	I
	<i>mt₅</i>	No radar emission information is produced or disseminated to the operators. Thus operators are unaware of neither the presence nor the type of radar emissions.	A
Interception of communications (voice or datalink)	<i>mt₆</i>	Enemy is warned about communication interception (voice or datalink). In other words, the enemy knows that we are aware of something about its communications or someone else' communications.	C
	<i>mt₇</i>	False positives are produced, i.e., Interceptions of communications are reported that do not exist or that are faked.	I
	<i>mt₈</i>	False negatives are produced, i.e., Communications that exist and that are intercepted are not reported by the ESM.	I
	<i>mt₉</i>	No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators. Operators are unaware of neither the presence nor the nature of the enemy's voice or datalink communications.	A

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

4

Determine the impacts on the mission



Mission Threat mt_3 : ‘False negatives are produced, i.e., radar emissions that exist and that are detected are not reported by the ESM.’

cap_1 : Conduct Maritime surface surveillance
Impact: **Medium**

	<i>Impact</i>	
cap_1	Medium	Orange
cap_2	Medium	Orange
cap_3	Very Low	Green
cap_4	Low	Yellow
cap_5	Low	Yellow
cap_6	Medium	Orange
cap_7	Low	Yellow
cap_8	Very Low	Green

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

4

Determine the impacts on the mission

*mt*₃: ‘False negatives are produced, i.e., radar emissions that exist and that are detected are not reported by the ESM.’

*cap*₁: Conduct Maritime surface surveillance

	Impact	
<i>cap</i> ₁	Medium	●
<i>cap</i> ₂	Medium	
<i>cap</i> ₃	Very Low	
<i>cap</i> ₄	Low	
<i>cap</i> ₅	Low	
<i>cap</i> ₆	Medium	
<i>cap</i> ₇	Low	
<i>cap</i> ₈	Very Low	

	Mission Dependency
<i>cap</i> ₁	Critical
<i>cap</i> ₂	Critical
<i>cap</i> ₃	Routine
<i>cap</i> ₄	Essential
<i>cap</i> ₅	Critical
<i>cap</i> ₆	Essential
<i>cap</i> ₇	Routine
<i>cap</i> ₈	Not allocated

Critical	
Essential	
Routine	
Not allocated	

	Mission-Dependent Capability Impact (<i>mt</i> ₃)
<i>cap</i> ₁	Essential
<i>cap</i> ₂	Routine
<i>cap</i> ₃	Very Low
<i>cap</i> ₄	Low
<i>cap</i> ₅	Low
<i>cap</i> ₆	Medium
<i>cap</i> ₇	Very Low
<i>cap</i> ₈	Very Low

Mission Impact = Criticality(*cap*₁) × Impact(*cap*₁)

Mission Impact = **Essential** × **Medium**

Mission Impact = **Medium**



	Mission Impact (<i>mt</i> ₃)
Max()	Medium

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

4

Determine the impacts on the mission



System Function	Mission Threat ID	Loss type	Mission Impact
Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions	mt_1	C	Low
	mt_2	I	Medium
	mt_3	I	Medium
	mt_4	I	Low
	mt_5	A	Medium
Interception of communications (voice or datalink)	mt_6	C	Medium
	mt_7	I	Low
	mt_8	I	Medium
	mt_9	A	Medium

mt_3 : 'False negatives are produced, i.e., radar emissions that exist and that are detected are not reported by the ESM.'

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



System Function → **Mission Threat** → **Mission Impact**

Interception of communications
(voice or datalink)

No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators.
(Loss of Availability)

Medium

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



System Function → **Mission Threat** → **Mission Impact**

Interception of communications
(voice or datalink)

No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators.

(Loss of Availability)

Medium

Risk Tolerance ?



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



		Impact				
		Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Likelihood	Very High	Medium	High	Very High	Very High	Very High
	High	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Very High
	Medium	Low	Medium	High	High	Very High
	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High
	Very Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium

Risk

- Very High
- High
- Medium
- Low



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



System Function → **Mission Threat** → **Mission Impact**

Interception of communications (voice or datalink)

No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators.
(Loss of Availability)

Medium

Risk Tolerance: Low

RCMAP – Example (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



ance: Low

MASRR.9

Priority: *Medium*

System: *Electronic Support Measure*

System Function: *Interception of communications (voice or datalink)*

Threat type: *Loss of Availability*

Requirement: *Risks to lose availability of interception of communications, i.e., no intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators, must be at a maximum of **Low**.*

Mission Assurance Security Risks Requirement (MASRR)

RCMAP – Example (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system



5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function

MASRR.9

Priority: *Medium*

System: *Electronic Support Measure*

System Function: *Interception of communications (voice or datalink)*

Threat type: *Loss of Availability*

Requirement: *Risks to lose availability of interception of communications. i.e., no intercepted communication information is*

Mission Assurance Security Risks Requirement (MASRR)

		Impact				
		Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Likelihood	Very High	Yellow	Orange	Red	Red	Red
	High	Green	Yellow	Orange	Red	Red
	Medium	Green	Yellow	Orange	Orange	Red
	Low	Green	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Orange
	Very Low	Green	Green	Green	Green	Yellow

Low.

Risk



Very High



High




Medium



Low

RCMAP – Example (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system



5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function

Mission Assurance Security Risks
Requirement (MASRR)

MASRR.1

Priority: *Low*

System: *Electronic Support Measure*

System Function: *Interception and analysis of radar emissions*

Threat type: *Loss of Confidentiality*

Requirement: *Risks to lose confidentiality of radar emissions information, i.e., enemy becoming aware of radar emissions interception and their classifications, must be at a maximum of *Low*.*

(...)

MASRR.9

Priority: *Medium*

System: *Electronic Support Measure*

System Function: *Interception of communications (voice or datalink)*

Threat type: *Loss of Availability*

Requirement: *Risks to lose availability of interception of communications, i.e., no intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators, must be at a maximum of *Low*.*

RCMAP – Example (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

5

Based on the mission impacts, determine the required level of security for each function



Mission Description

System Functions

Mission Assurance Security Risks Requirements

Rules and Policies

Security Profiling

CSF
Security Profile

CSF Security Function	CSF Security Category	CSF Security Subcategory
Identify	Asset Management	External information systems are catalogued
	Access Control	Network integrity is protected, incorporating network segregation where appropriate
Protect	Access Control	Access permissions are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
	Data Security	Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)


Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

6

Define potential cyber threat scenarios on your assets that could affect the functions



Scope definition:



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)


Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

6

Define potential cyber threat scenarios on your assets that could affect the functions



Risk assessment:



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

6

Define potential cyber threat scenarios on your assets that could affect the functions



Risk assessment:

Threat scenario TS.1

Infected USB key

Maintenance LAN

Malware infection

Router/Firewall

Comm. interface reconfiguration

Firewall by-passing

Consultant

Administrator

Operators

ESM

ECM

Comm. interface

Comm. interface



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

6

Define potential cyber threat scenarios on your assets that could affect the functions



Risk assessment:

Threat Scenario	Attack Phases	Likelihood	Impact	Risk
TS.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Maintenance Lan / Infected USB drive Maintenance Laptop / Malware installation Router / Firewall bypassing ESM / Communication interface reconfiguration 	Low	Medium	Medium
TS.2	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Outsider / ESM firmware tampering Outsider / Personal computer connection to router Router / Firewall bypassing ESM / Malicious firmware upload 	Very Low	High	Low
TS.3	(...)	Medium	High	High
(...)	(...)			

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system


7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level



Risk assessment:

Threat scenario TS.1



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level




Risk assessment:

CSF Security Profile

Threat scenario

CSF Security Function	CSF Security Category	CSF Security Subcategory
Identify	Asset Management	External information systems are catalogued
	Access Control	Network integrity is protected, incorporating network segregation where appropriate
Protect	Access Control	Access permissions are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
	Data Security	Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level



Risk analysis:

System Function	Mission Threat ID	Loss type	Mission Impact	Associated threat scenarios	Max Likelihood	Max Risk
Interception and analysis of adversaries' radar emissions	mt_1	C	Low	none	none	none
	mt_2	I	High	TS.2, TS.3, TS.4, TS.9	Medium	High
	mt_3	I	High	TS.2, TS.3, TS.4, TS.9	Medium	High
	mt_4	I	Low	TS.2, TS.3, TS.4, TS.9	Medium	High
	mt_5	A	Medium	TS.1	Low	Medium
Interception of communications (voice or datalink)	mt_6	C	Low	none	none	none
	mt_7	I	Medium	TS.2, TS.3, TS.4, TS.9	Medium	High
	mt_8	I	Medium	TS.2, TS.3, TS.4, TS.9	Medium	High
	mt_9	A	Medium	TS.1	Low	Medium

mt_9 : No intercepted communication information is produced or disseminated to the operators. (...)

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level

Security Architecture

SR.1 : Removable media policy


SR.2 : Removable media white listing

SR.3 : Secure ports configuration

SR.4 : Implement deep packet inspection

SR.5 : Enable access control


SR.6 : Restrict file permissions





RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system



7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level

Security Architecture

Asset	Security Measure	Related Security Requirement(s)
Removable Media
Removable Media
	Port management:	
Maintenance Laptop	All UDP ports closed except for 161, 162 and 443. All TCP ports closed except for 22 and 80	SSR.4
Router/Firewall
	SSH Key-Based Authentication:	
	Algorithm: RSA	
	Key size: 4096 bits	
	SSH key rotation every 3 months	
ESM	SSH key removal management	SSR.6
	Disable logins as root	
	Change the port number to an arbitrary number	
ESM
Mission LAN
Mission LAN



RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level



Security Architecture and Design / Implementation

Security Measure	Asset	Security System or Security Function
...		...
Port management	Maintenance Laptop	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Port scanning script (<code>portscan.sh</code>) + manual service management using <code>sysv-rc-conf</code> Local firewall: defined in script <code>esm_firewall.sh</code> that uses <code>iptables</code>.
...		...
SSH Key-Based Authentication	ESM	OpenSSH / SSH version 2 Port 25222
...		...

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Fictitious)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level



Residual risks with security architecture:

Threat Scenario	Attack Phases	Likelihood	Impact	Risk	Residual Risk
TS.1	<ol style="list-style-type: none">Maintenance Lan / Infected USB driveMaintenance Laptop / Malware installationRouter / Firewall bypassingESM / Communication interface reconfiguration	Low	Medium	Moderate	Low
TS.2	<ol style="list-style-type: none">Outsider / ESM firmware tamperingOutsider / Personal computer connection to routerRouter / Firewall bypassingESM / Malicious firmware upload	Very Low	High	Low	Low
TS.3	(...)	Medium	High	High	Low
(...)	(...)				

RCMAP – Example-driven Overview (Threat Mitigations)

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system

7

Develop security solutions to mitigate the risks of the threat scenarios to an acceptable level

Identification

Options Analysis

Definition

Implementation



Security Guidance / Continuous Monitoring

In-service

Disposal

Threat scenario

Security Verification

Infected USB key

SR.1 : Removable media policy

SR.2 : Removable media white listing

SR.3 : Secure ports configuration

Malware infection

ESM

ECM

Consultant

Router/Firewall

Comm. interface reconfiguration

SR.4 : Implement deep packet inspection

Firewall by-passing

SR.5 : Enable access control

SR.6 : Restrict file permissions

Administrator

Confidentiality

Levels of Security

Sensitive government information and assets	Protected Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause injury to a non-national interest; that is, an individual interest such as a person or an organization.			Classified Unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause injury to the national interest – defence and maintenance of the social, political and economic stability of Canada.		
	Protected A Injury to an individual, organization or government	Protected B Serious injury to an individual, organization or government	Protected C Extremely grave injury to an individual, organization or government	Confidential Injury to the national interest	Secret Serious injury to the national interest	Top Secret Exceptionally grave injury to the national interest
Personnel	Reliability status (RS) Required by an employee working on a sensitive government contract to access Protected (A, B, and C) information and assets.			Personnel security clearance (PSC) Required by an employee working on a sensitive government contract to access Classified (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) information and assets (may also access Protected information).		
Private sector organization	Designated organization screening (DOS) Allows an organization to send appropriately security screened personnel with a need-to-know to restricted work sites to access protected information and assets.			Facility security screening (FSC) Allows a company to send appropriately security screened personnel with a need-to-know to restricted work sites to access Protected and Classified information and assets.		

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
Canadian classified security levels correspond to those of NATO but require a special briefing and agreement to NATO terms.

Additional organization screenings may be granted to organizations with a DOS or FSC.

Document safeguarding capability (DSC): the authorization for organizations to store, handle and protect Protected or Classified information or assets at their work site(s). **Production:** the authorization for organizations to manufacture sensitive assets. **Physical Security for IT Security or COMSEC/INFOSEC:** may be required for specific contracts.

Requirements decomposition

